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Remarks Juan Carlos de Pablo
The following observations on the impact of inflation on the economy in
general, and on the capital market in particular, evolve from the Argen-
tine experience, an extremely interesting case on all inflation issues
except one, namely, how to stop it.
1. Under high inflation (say, 8 percent per month, per week, etc.)
either direct price controls evaporate or the corresponding commodity
disappears. This fact does not mean that, as the rate of inflation increases,
the evaporation of direct price controls becomes equivalent to the ab-
sence of controls. The reason for the difference is that, in general, the
evaporation of direct price controls is far from being a resource-free
activity. On the contrary, however difficult to estimate econometrically,
it seems clear that the evaporation of direct price controls is an activity
specially intensive in human resources, a scarce resource indeed (when
managers perceive that the private rate of return of designing evasion
mechanisms is the most profitable alternative they face, they do not have
time for other activities, like introducing technical change, quality im-
provements, etc.).
In the case of capital markets under high inflation, the mentioned facts
imply that the option is not between free interest rates and controlled
interest rates that segment the financial market in two sections, but
whether in the absence of direct controls the markets develop "effi-
ciently" (i.e., minimizing the spread) or because of the existence of
controls on interest rates, the funds are channelled through alternative
and inefficient routes, since mainly because of lack of transparency the
spread increases significantly.
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2. In most cases high inflation implies variable inflation. Logue and
Willett (1977) popularized this view, although in my opinion for the
wrong reason. The difficulty with the Logue-Willett "demonstration" of
the thesis is that in the empirical analysis their proxy for variability is the
standard deviation of past inflation, a well-known estimator of absolute
variability. Question: What is relevant in the estimation of the variability
of the rate of inflation, the use of indicators of absolute or of relative
variability? No simple answer can be given to this question. On the one
hand, it is clear that if you expected 1,000,000 percent rate of inflation,
and observed inflation was "just" 999,000 percent, your absolute error is
equal to one thousand percentage points, but it does not have any
practical difference
1 (which means that relative indicators do matter); but
on the other hand, if you expected 0.1 percent rate of inflation and the
observed rate was 0.2 percent, your error was 100 percent, but also it does
not have any practical difference
2 (which suggests that to a certain extent
indicators of absolute error also matter). Some mixed estimator, derived
from the percentual gain (or loss) of a loan made at a fixed nominal
interest rate on the basis of the expected rate of inflation should be
designed. My guess is that when the "correct" estimator is computed, the
computation will confirm the popular view that the higher the rate of
inflation the higher its variability.
3. What is the consequence of high and variable inflation on the
economy, beyond the loss involved in the mentioned misallocation of
human resources? High and variable inflation reduces significantly the
time horizon of the economy. (In Argentina there is a joke that says, the
Argentinian who knows where to spend his next weekend has already
solved his long-run problems).
The reduction of the time horizon of the economy affects mainly the
level and composition of investment. It is clearly impossible to increase
the volume of output of a given investment, but under the conditions
mentioned the real value of output and profits should be increased (i.e.,
the payoff period reduced) if the project is expected to be carried out; this
means that the inflation-induced increase in uncertainty reduces ceteris
paribus the level of investment.
4. Indexed and floating rate loans, bonds, and time deposits are one of
the main by-products of the capital market under conditions of high and
variable inflation. Under the mentioned circumstances it has proved a
useful mechanism, since it combines nonprohibitive administrative costs
with the need for almost instantaneous recontracting as a result of the
change in economic conditions.
1. If you borrowed money at an ex ante zero real interest rate, you will end up paying a
0.1 percent real rate.
2. If you lent money at an ex ante zero interest rate, you will end up getting a 0.1 percent
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5. For the happy few who still live in countries in which inflation is not a
problem, the main lesson that emerges from these observations is very
simple: DO NOT BE SOFT ON INFLATION. As an Argentinian, I
know what I am talking about.
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Remarks Miguel Mancera
During this conference, very interesting points were made on the rela-
tionship between taxation and the financing of private business. This
relationship is so important that it well deserves further comment.
Obviously, the structure of taxes heavily influences both the develop-
ment of financial markets and the way in which firms fund their opera-
tions. It seems, however, that in a considerable number of countries, tax
rules may hinder the financing of business, and consequently, they may
also impair economic development. This is the case because such rules
were designed for other countries whose economic features are quite
different.
The argument can be presented by means of a very simplified model
which, in essence, may be applicable to several countries.
The assumptions required for the model to hold are the following:
(1) that there are close financial links between the country's economy and
international financial markets; (2) that capital can move to and from
these markets, whether legally or illegally; and (3) that it is practically
impossible to tax or to collect tax on income obtained abroad by
individuals.
Under these assumptions, it is clear that, for banking intermediation to
be successful, the after-tax yield of bank deposits in the country in
question must be competitive with the yield of bank deposits abroad—
usually not taxed when the depositor is a foreigner. Thus, other things
being equal, any tax on interest from domestic bank deposits brings about
an increase in the deposit interest rate, since this is clearly the only way
for the after-tax yield to continue being competitive with the rates
obtained abroad. Therefore, it can be seen that, even though formally the
taxpayer is the depositor, the real taxpayer is most likely the borrower.
This holds true except to the extent that the fiscal burden is absorbed by
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the financial intermediary when the conditions of the supply and demand
for loanable funds do not allow such intermediaries to pass on the tax
burden to the borrower. Therefore, under the assumptions made, and
with this possible exception, it can be asserted that tax on interest is not
an income tax but a tax on the use of credit.
Some comments are also worth making on the way in which taxation
may affect the stock market and equity financing.
Let us assume that the tax on corporate profits is 50 percent, that there
is no dividend tax, and that the after-tax yield of debt is around 4 percent,
as it might well be in a zero inflation economy. In these circumstances, for
a firm to be able to raise equity capital, it would be necessary for the
after-tax corporate profit to be competitive with the net yield of bank
deposits, namely, 4 percent, which implies that an 8 percent before-tax
corporate profit is required. In practice, this means that there would be a
tax on the use of equity capital equivalent to 100 percent of the net yield
for the shareholder.
The fact that, under the assumptions made, an income tax—whether
on interest or on profits—becomes a tax on the use of capital may have a
serious contractionist effect on investment. This contractionist effect,
however, is greatly amplified by inflation, and the higher the inflation, the
greater the effect.
Imagine an economy with an inflation rate of 30 percent in which the
tax on interest is 15 percent, and where the after-tax yield of bank
deposits is 34 percent—4 percent in real terms. In such a case, the loan
rate would have to be around 40 percent to cover just the net yield of bank
deposits, plus the 15 percent tax—not considering the operational cost
and the profit of the financial intermediary. This implies, in turn, that the
real loan rate would have to be around 10 percent to cover only the net
yield and the tax of bank deposits. Whereas, without inflation, a 4 percent
after-tax yield of bank deposits would require a gross interest rate of
around 4.7 percent, which would be the real loan rate required to cover
the net yield to the depositor, plus the tax. Thereby, as can be seen in this
example, inflation implies more than doubling the real loan rate.
The situation with regard to equity, however, becomes much more
difficult in inflation, under the already made assumptions that corporate
tax would be 50 percent and that the net yield of bank deposits would be
34 percent. Then, profits would have to be 68 percent in nominal terms, at
least, to produce a net yield of 34 percent, which would be the minimum
required to raise equity capital if the after-tax interest rate corresponding
to bank deposits is 34 percent.
One wonders if there might be many investment projects with a return
higher than 68 percent in nominal terms, even in an economy with 30
percent inflation. If there are not many, it will become extremely difficult
to finance firms with equity capital alone, so that more leverage will be281 Capital Market and High and Variable Inflation
needed. This explains why the structure of balance sheets of businesses
has deteriorated so much over the years. Indeed, degrees of leverage that
some time ago were unacceptable to bankers, today have to be swallowed
by them if firms and banks are to continue to exist. And, even worse, if
the rate of return of projects is not above the high real cost of the mixture
of debt and equity, investment will tend to contract.
During the first stages of inflation, corporate profits may increase
tremendously, enabling firms to raise equity capital in spite of the difficul-
ties imposed by a fiscal system like the one outlined; but high rates of
profit are very difficult to maintain for the average firm over long periods
of time. They decrease as inflation permeates the markets of inputs or,
perhaps, because the government intervenes to control prices.
These reflections make one think that countries which are in a situation
somehow resembling this simplified model would be well advised to
either suppress or decrease inflation or, else, reform their tax systems.
Considerable progress has been made in the latter course of action,
especially in connection with depreciation rules that acknowledge re-
valuation of assets; but this progress—when and where achieved—has
lagged tremendously behind the appearance of the problems to be solved
and seldom has amounted to a complete solution. Monetary stability,
however, would have avoided the distortions mentioned which have
implied high social costs and delayed economic development over the
years.
Remarks Mario Henrique Simonsen
Capital market instruments and regulations have been frequently de-
veloped under the implicit assumption of long-term price stability. High
and variable inflation rates, which are correlated problems of today's
world, introduce two types of inefficiencies in such traditional arrange-
ments. The first type is related to the existence of money illusion based
regulations, which drag the development of capital markets whenever the
inflation rate exceeds a certain limit. Inefficiencies of the second type
result from the inability of the traditional capital market structure to deal
with widespread price uncertainty.
Usury ceilings provide the most extreme case of money illusion in
regulations and might destroy all bond markets, as occurred in Brazil in
1964. Interest rate controls produce the same type of distortions. Con-
ventional accounting, which fails to distinguish between real and nominal
profit, spreads misleading information to the markets, underrating the
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stocks of the high debt/equity ratio corporations. High inflation rates
transform the capital gains tax into a sales tax. Income taxes subsidize the
borrowers at the expense of the lenders. Of course, if tax rates were the
same for all economic agents, the above mentioned transfer effect would
be offset by an upward adjustment of nominal interest rates. Yet, a
number of distortions might arise as a result of different economic agents
being taxed at different rates, a natural outcome of a progressive income
tax. Moreover, usury ceilings and interest rate controls might prevent the
adjustment mechanism from working.
Even in the absence of money illusion in the regulations, price uncer-
tainties challenge the efficiency of the traditional capital market instru-
ments. Since most economic agents are risk averse the most immediate
effect of price uncertainty is to destroy the market for long-term bonds
with fixed nominal interest rates. Because of the exacerbated risk pre-
mium, any nominal interest rate which might attract the lender becomes
too high for the borrower and vice versa. Housing industries, which are
heavily dependent on long-term mortgages are the first to be hurt by the
uncertainty trap.
According to economic theory, there is one single way to restore the
efficiency of the competitive markets under uncertainty, namely, to make
every contract contingent on the state of nature. Of course problems of
moral hazard and costs of listing and checking all the possible states of
nature prevent the world from behaving according to the Arrow-Debreu
model of general equilibrium under uncertainty. This, incidentally, ex-
plains why price and real interest rate uncertainties, which appear in
practice as an inevitable by-product of chronic inflation, always create
some troubles to capital markets. Yet, if one is bound to live with
inflation, indexed bonds might emerge as a good proxy to the Arrow-
Debreu contingent claims. In fact, fully indexed contracts would solve the
Arrow-Debreu equations with uncertainty if shocks were purely nomi-
nal. Of course, full indexation ceases to be optimal when real shocks are
brought onto the stage.
To sum up, high and variable inflation rates have never been the ideal
setup for the development of capital markets since they introduce price
and interest rate uncertainties which cannot be properly offset by en-
forceable contracts. Yet, if one has to live with inflation, the foregoing
analysis suggests some steps to take to minimize the market frictions. The
first step is to abolish all money illusioned regulations, which may include
usury ceilings and interest rate controls. The second step is to make
inflationary accounting mandatory, to convey to the stock market the
correct information on the economic performance of the corporations.
Regarding the market for indexed bonds, one should let it choose its
own course. When shocks are basically nominal, such bonds provide the
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one should not hinder the development of the market for indexed bonds
by artificial regulations or by inappropriate fiscal treatment. But there is
no point in forcing the market, that is, making bond indexation man-
datory, since they are a poor instrument when inflation rates are substan-
tially affected by supply shocks. Regulations should favor the coexistence
of both indexed and nominal bonds. Moreover, some additional
flexibility would be gained if contracting parties could freely chose their
preferred price indices.
A more advanced step is to index both the income tax and the capital
gain tax. Income tax indexation involves much deeper changes than the
simple automatic adjustment of the personal income tax brackets accord-
ing to observed inflation rates. It also involves the tax distinction between
nominal and real interest rates, as well as the taxation of the corporate
profits on the basis of the inflationary accounting results. Of course
indexation here requires a complete tax reform to avoid revenue losses. It
is not a faultless step, since it eliminates the fiscal drag on inflation
provided by the conventional income tax structure. Yet, one must recog-
nize that chronic inflation sooner or later forces a trade-off between
economic efficiency and price drags. Fixed exchange rates also produce a
very important drag on inflation rates, but are obviously inconsistent with
chronic price increases.